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Introduction
Japan and the Republic of Korea (hereafter, South Korea) have more in common
with one another than they do with Western countries. These two geographically
contiguous nations operate legal systems rooted in civil law and Confucian cultural
traditions are deeply ingrained. Considerable similarities stem from these common
structural and cultural characteristics, but similarities also derive from direct
influences, such as the diffusion of policy from one country to the other. Just as
Japan, for instance, has assimilated Western approaches to medical care and the
design of health insurance programmes, South Korea has, in turn, taken policy
lessons from Japan. It would appear that Japanese experience is the source of
inspiration for many South Korean policy developments. Nevertheless, despite
many commonalities, the two countries also differ widely in many ways. In the field
of health insurance, the Japanese health insurance system is composed of thousands
of insurers. This is not the case for its South Korean counterpart. As will be
discussed in this article, between 1998 and 2003 South Korea shifted from a social
health insurance (SHI) system with multiple payers to a national health insurance
(NHI) system with a single payer.1
As the example of health insurance underlines, these two countries, in spite of
having similar backgrounds, have diverged as a consequence of having followed
different reform processes. This article explores the influence of political economy
and how this may have influenced the observed variance in national reforms. The
article is structured as follows: the next section looks to the historical development of
nationwide health insurance coverage in Japan and South Korea. This is followed by
an examination of how the two systems came to diverge and the impact this has had
on health system design. The political economy dimension of health insurance
reform in the two countries is then discussed and a concluding section offers final
observations.
The development of health insurance in Japan and the
Republic of Korea
Japan
The first mandatory health insurance scheme2 providing general health care to
Japan’s population came into effect in 1927 with the implementation of the Health
1. Lee et al. (2008) categorize National Health Insurance (NHI) as different from Social Health
Insurance (SHI), thereby offering a category by means of which to classify the idiosyncratic development
of the health systems of South Korea and Taiwan (China) witnessed since the 1990s.
2. Prior to the introduction of the mandatory health insurance scheme, there had been a form of health
insurance for the military, public servants and some business employees since the second half of the
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Insurance Act (Table 1).3 The Employment Health Insurance (EHI), or Kenko
Hoken, was composed of two schemes: the Government-managed Health Insurance
(GMHI), which was predominantly targeted at workers of small- andmedium-sized
nineteenth century. And a compulsory workmen’s compensation scheme, intended to cover injuries at
work, was introduced in 1911 in the form of a Factory Law.
3. This had been written into law in 1922, but implementation was withheld owing to earthquakes in the
Kanto area.
Table 1. The development of public health insurance in Japan and South Korea
Japan South Korea
Prior to the
introduction of
public health
insurance scheme
1911: Workmen’s Compensation scheme
implemented
1963: Health Insurance Act written into law
1922: Health Insurance Act written into law
1964: Workmen’s Compensation scheme
implemented
Introduction and
development of
worksite health
insurance
1927: Employment Health Insurance (EHI)
implemented for blue-collar employees
1977: Compulsory health insurance
implemented for businesses with 500 or
more employees
1934: EHI expanded to businesses with ﬁve
or more employees 1979: Insurance for government employees
(KMIC) organized, and compulsory health
insurance expanded to businesses with 300
or more employees
1937: EHI expanded to white- collar
employees
1981: Compulsory health insurance
expanded to businesses with 100 or more
employees
1939: EHI for white-collar employees
established independently
1983: Compulsory health insurance
expanded to businesses with 16 or more
employees
1941: Insurance for government employees
implemented
1988: Compulsory health insurance
expanded to businesses with ﬁve or more
employees
1941: EHI applied to employees’
dependants
1942 EHI incorporated both blue- and white
collar employees
Introduction and
development of
municipal (locality)
health insurance
1938: National Health Insurance (NHI) Act
passed (NHI programmes by municipalities)
1988: Compulsory health insurance
expanded to cover farming and ﬁshing
communities
1958: New NHI Act passed
1989: Compulsory health insurance
expanded to cover urban areas, thereby
realizing “health insurance for all”
1961: NHI programmes applied to all
municipalities, thereby realizing “health
insurance for all”
Uniﬁcation or
integration of
health insurers
1968, 1973, 1984 and 2003: Co-payment
rates adjusted and ﬁnally pegged uniformly
at 30% in 2003
1997: National Health Insurance Act for
integration of health insurers passed
1983: Health Service System for the Elderly
implemented
2000: National Health Insurance Corporation
(NHIC) established as a single insurer
2008: Medical Care Scheme for the Senior
Elderly implemented
2003: Demarcation between worksite and
locality insurance accounts under the NHIC
removed
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enterprises and their families, and Society-managed Health Insurance (SMHI),
largely embracing employees of large corporations and their families.4 The EHI
initially applied to blue-collar workers, serving businesses with ten or more
employees on the payroll, which covered 3 per cent of the Japanese population.
Thereafter, in 1934, coverage under the EHI expanded to businesses with five or
more employees, then white-collar employees in 1937, and finally employees’
dependants in 1941.
While employees and their families benefited from the coverage provided by the
EHI, those deemed to be self-employed or non-employed, including farmers and
fishermen, were left disadvantaged, having no employers to pay contributions on
their behalf and no salaries from which to deduct their own contributions. The
1920s and 1930s saw the emergence of farmers’ cooperatives, but their number and
influence soon declined.
In response to this, the National Health Insurance Act, the legal framework for
health insurance operated at the municipal level, was enacted in 1938. The
municipal-level (locality) National Health Insurance (Kokumin Kenko Hoken) was
not a compulsory scheme, but the national government did provide subsidies to the
health insurers created by the municipalities. Kokumin Kenko Hoken continued to
expand, with the number of insured persons increasing sharply after the outbreak of
the Second World War — coverage was encouraged by means of government
support that, among other goals, sought a healthy population fit for military service.
By 1943, 70 per cent of the Japanese population came under the umbrella of health
insurance coverage in one form or another (Campbell and Ikegami, 1998).
However, with the government’s financial situation worsening during the later
stages of the Second World War, many municipal-level (locality) health insurance
schemes were discontinued, resulting in the insurance coverage rate falling below
60 per cent of the population. The financing problem confronting national
government and the municipalities reached its nadir immediately following 1945.5
In 1950, the year the KoreanWar broke out, the Japanese economy grew rapidly,
resulting in an operating surplus for the EHI. This paved the way for many
municipalities to resume the Kokumin Kenko Hoken and, by 1956, 68 per cent of the
total population was covered by health insurance. The percentage of workers
without health insurance coverage was estimated at 27 per cent. In the mid 1950s,
Japan’s two main political parties both competed for votes under the banner of
4. Shimazaki (2005) argues that the use of two schemes was well suited to the prevailing circumstances
at that time, taking into consideration the fact that small companies were not able to manage their own
health insurance society.
5. In 1947, General Headquarters went so far as to propose to expand significantly National Treasury
subsidies with the aim of rebuilding the national health insurance programme (Yoshihara and Wada,
2008).
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“health insurance for all”, and by 1958 the National Insurance Act was passed, with
universal health insurance achieved in 1961.
Republic of Korea
Health insurance, in the form of a social insurance programme, was introduced in
South Korea in 1977 when it became legally mandatory for all large employers with
500 or more employees on the payroll to provide a health insurance programme
(Table 1). Underlying and conducive to the introduction of the programme were a
number of factors: sound economic fundamentals, which had been put into place
through the successful implementation of the third Five-Year Economic
Development Plan (1972-1976); a growing demand for social security provisions,
owing in part to the absence of a national contributory pension programme at that
time; the then incumbent President Park Jung-Hee’s competitive mentality, not
least with regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and the influence of
Japan, first, in shaping the design of South Korea’s pilot programmes for health
insurance and, second, in that its institutions and experiences provided South Korea
with unsurpassed information essential to minimizing trials and errors in the early
development phases.
In 1979, a separate health insurance (administered by the Korea Medical
Insurance Cooperation — KMIC) was organized for government employees and
private school teachers. In July of the same year, compulsory health insurance was
expanded to cover businesses with 300 or more employees, thereby enrolling
21 per cent of the entire population. Beginning in January 1981, businesses with 100
or more employees on the payroll were subject to health insurance. Coverage
was then expanded further to include businesses with 16 or more employees in 1983
and expanded once more in 1988 to include those with five or more employees.
From January 1988, health insurance was expanded to cover farming and fishing
communities.Membership for health insurance was based on the family unit, where
the family head paid the contributions. A total of 134 health insurers were
instituted; one in each county. Subsequently, in July 1989, 110 urban area health
insurers were instituted, one in each city or metropolitan district. This development
marked the achievement of universal health insurance, only 12 years after health
insurance had been introduced to the country.
Two national systems for universal health insurance
As regards the structure of health insurance used to achieve “health insurance for
all”, a close similarity is found between Japan in 1961 and South Korea in 1989.
Japan’s insurers, which numbered almost 5,000, and those of South Korea, which
numbered over 400, had a basic structure in common, as shown in Table 2. First,
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insurer organizations for specific professions, such as public servants and teachers,
were formed independently: 13 per cent of the population belonged to such insurers
in Japan, while 11 per cent of the population did so in South Korea. Second, in
Japan, the GMHI, with the Social Insurance Agency as the single insurer, covered
21 per cent of the population, and the SMHI, comprising 1,091 insurers, covered a
further 14 per cent. In South Korea, there was no government-managed provision as
in Japan, but 154 worksite insurers covered 39 per cent of the population. Third, in
Japan, 3,659 municipal-level (locality) health insurers, whose services were aimed
largely at the self-employed and the elderly, covered 49 per cent of the population,
as compared to South Korea where 254 municipal-level (locality) health insurers
covered 45 per cent of the population.
Divergence between the two health insurance systems
Discussions on integrating health insurers in Japan
In Japan, questions have been raised periodically over problems about the health
insurance system,which remains fragmented into thousands of insurers (3,576 as of
2009). Endeavours to address this fragmentation have been made largely in two
directions (Table 3). First, a move toward ichigenka, or “harmonization in
contributions and benefits”, is under way. This seeks to remove differences in the
value of the insurance contributions levied and the benefits offered by different
insurers, but without altering the manner in which health insurers are organized.6
This has been a consistent position taken by the Ministry of Health andWelfare and
the Liberal Democratic Party. Second, an attempt is being made to reduce the
number of health insurers (“organizational integration”). This entails two possible
lines of action: a move whereby the market size of individual insurers is enlarged
and the number of insurers is curtailed, while keeping worksite insurers and
municipal (locality) insurers separate (kouikika or “enlargement”),7 or a move
whereby the two types of insurer — worksite and municipal (locality) — are
integrated (ipponka or “streamlined integration”).8
Harmonization of insurance contributions and benefits. Proposals for improving
the equity of the health insurance system usually centre on equalizing co-payments.
When “health insurance for all” was achieved in 1961, the co-payment rate was set
6. This differs from the discussions over the integration of health insurers addressed in this article in that
the organizational structure remains separate.
7. Niki (2001) had proposed this programme as the most reasonable and practicable one, but this was
before the Koizumi government decided on the ipponka programme as the policy direction to take.
8. This follows with the nature of integration outlined in this article, in that it seeks the merger of
organizations.
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at 50 per cent in the municipal (locality) health insurance and for family members
of insured workers under the EHI (no co-payment was borne by the insured
workers in the EHI).9 In a move to cope with financial deficits in the 1960s, the
Ministry of Health and Welfare came up with a measure to rectify imbalances
among contribution rates and gaps between benefits, thus initiating discussions
over ichigenka (harmonization) (Yoshihara and Wada, 2008). The co-payment rate
in themunicipal (locality) insurance was lowered to 30 per cent in 1968, and the rate
borne by family members in the EHI programmes decreased from 50 per cent to
30 per cent in 1973. Ichigenka (harmonization) emerged as a central reform theme
when the Health Insurance Act was amended in 1984. As a result, co-payment rates
were pegged at 20 per cent, and financial adjustments for risk equalization were
implemented.
In 2003, co-payment rates increased and were pegged uniformly at 30 per cent,
with the exception of 10 per cent for the elderly and 20 per cent for infants and
children aged three or younger. Nonetheless, SMHI may offer additional benefits
under the collective contracts covering employees. For instance, employees of large
9. In his memorial statement for “health insurance for all” in 1961, Yoshimi Furui, the then Minister of
Health and Welfare, made it clear that the greatest task henceforth would be to adjust the imbalance
between insurances (Mizumaki, 1993).
Table 3. Types of integration of health insurers in Japan
Types Japanese terminology Contents Examples
Harmonization in
contributions and
beneﬁts
Ichigenka
(Harmonization)
• To remove differences in
contributions and beneﬁts
without changing
organizational structure
• Measures to rectify the
imbalances of contributions
and gaps of beneﬁts since the
1960s
• Co-payment rates uniformly
pegged at 30% in 2003
Organizational
integration
Kouikika
(Enlargement)
• To expand the size of
individual insurers and curtail
the number of insurers
• “Health insurance for
white-collar employees”
incorporated into the
Employee Health Insurance
(EHI) in 1942• To keep worksite insurers
and municipal (locality)
insurers separate
• General Headquarters’ idea in
1947
• Ikeda administration’s idea in
1961
• “Memorandum of
understanding” in late 1980s
• Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) public pledge in 2009
Organizational
integration
Ipponka (Streamlined
integration)
• To integrate worksite
insurers and municipal
(locality) insurers under the
same insurer
• Koizumi government’s “Basic
guideline” in 2003 to expand
insurers, prefecture by
prefecture
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firms may have entitlement to longer periods of leave on health grounds. The
operating profits of some insurers are such that they are able to reimburse part of
the co-payment and to provide free or subsidized health examinations. The
contribution rate charged by the EHI ranges from 3 per cent to 10 per cent of wages.
Large firms often pay up to 80 per cent of the total contribution — well over the
50 per cent mark that is set as the lower limit by law. There is also wide variation in
the contribution amounts charged by the municipal (locality) health insurance,
with the highest contribution, in the town of Rausu in Hokkaido, being 4.7 greater
than the lowest (Jones, 2009).
Organizational integration of health insurers. The debate about “organizational
integration” goes back as far as 1942, the year in which “health insurance for
white-collar employees” was incorporated into the EHI.10 In 1947, the General
Headquarters’ “measure for the reconstruction of the locality health insurance”
embraced the idea of incorporating various health insurance programmes into the
municipal (locality) health insurance. However, this idea was not implemented and
remained nothing more than an “idea” (Sugiyama, 1995; Sugita, 2008). A move
toward “ipponka” (integration) emerged later as part of the process of discussing
universal health insurance. The idea presented was that all insurance programmes
operating in any given geographic area should be integrated into one that was
centred on the municipal (locality) health insurance. This idea, however, was not
acceptable under the terms of the new Act for municipal (locality) health insurance.
Immediately after achieving universal health insurance in 1961, the Ikeda
administration discussed whether to merge both the employment-based and the
municipal (locality) programmes into one (ipponka) — at a time when the GMHI
had an operational deficit. After heated discussion on ipponka under Tsuneo
Uchida, the then Minister of Health and Welfare, it was concluded that health
insurance should “stay on a dual basis”.11 Discussions over ichigenka
(harmonization) in 1984, as mentioned before, were later followed by those over
ipponka (integration) upon requests from the Japanese Medical Association
(Yoshihara andWada, 2008). Discussions kicked off with theMinistry of Health and
Welfare taking the lead.12 However, neither the Liberal Democratic Party nor the
Ministry of Health and Welfare were positive about ipponka. This led to the
conclusion in 1989 that “while it was ideal to integrate health insurance systems into
10. “Health insurance for white-collar employees” was mapped out independently in 1939, and thus
lasted for three years only.
11. The main reason suggested was that integration would result in a lower level of contributions and
benefits without support from the National Treasury.
12. Memorandum of understanding exchanged among the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese
Medical Association etc., contained the phrase: “ipponka (integration) in the health insurance system to
be implemented within five years while seeking equality in contributions and benefits” (Yoshihara and
Wada, 2008).
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one, such a goal is to be pursued through the Health Service System for the Elderly
for the time being”.
When a measure of ichigenka was reached by means of the harmonization of
the reimbursement level in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, the
Japanese government established a new political objective: to enlarge the market
size of insurers (kouikika), which is sometimes referred also to as ichigenka
(Murakami, 2009). The “basic guideline for the health insurance system and the
insurance payment system”, prepared by the Koizumi government in 2003,
decided to examine the restructuring and integration of insurers, prefecture by
prefecture, in order to tackle the problem of fragmentation in the health
insurance system. However, such reform sought gradual changes in line with a
programme to equalize risk across the country’s many health insurers, while
maintaining the health insurance system’s existing dichotomized structure
(Health and Welfare Statistical Association, 2007).
The Medical Care Scheme for the Senior Elderly, which was established on a
separate basis in 2008, seeks a degree of ipponka (integration). To mitigate the
monetary burden added by the new scheme, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
administration made an attempt to re-adjust financing between employment-based
insurers, dubbing it “ichigenka (harmonization) in the health insurance system”. In
2009, the newly-elected Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration made a
commitment in its public policy pledge that it would abolish the Medical Care
Scheme for the Senior Elderly and integrate all health insurers into the municipal
(locality) insurers (Democratic Party of Japan, 2009). This move was dubbed
ichigenka (harmonization) but, in fact, falls into ipponka (integration) in its nature.
Contrary to that which was pledged, there were very few who thought such
commitments would be realized in the near future, even among those who argued
for ipponka (Sakurai, 2010), and even in the DPJ.13
The achievement of integration in the Republic of Korea
Disputes over integration during the expansion period of public health insurance.
Disputes, often with a political dimension, over the integration of independent
health insurers were ongoing in South Korea over the 20-year period from the early
1980s to the early 2000s. The expanded application of health insurance in 1979 led
to a dispute over setting an optimum size for insurers. When Chun Myung-Kee,
Minister of Health and Social Affairs, sought to launch a plan for integrating the
existing “network of health insurers” and the insurer for government employees and
teachers (KMIC) into one, the network branded it as “integrationism”. This marked
13. Umemura and Nagao (2009), a DPJ Senator, also insisted on the integration of insurance
contributions, namely, ichigenka.
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the initiation of long-lasting controversies.14 The majority of bureaucrats within the
Ministry were against the plan proposed and spearheaded by the Minister and
supported by a minority of bureaucrats. The proposed plan collapsed when the
President instructed the Minister to conduct a full-scale review.15 Turbulence
erupted later in 1983 when some of the pro-integration bureaucrats were ousted
from theMinistry. This served as an opportunity for the ongoing integration reform
to be perceived as congruous with the “democratization” movement that, at that
time, was campaigning against the authoritative style of South Korea’s government.
This turned out to be “the first round of the integration controversy” (Kim, 2000).
With the announcement of the planned extension of health insurance coverage
to those working in the farming and fishing industries in January 1988, anger
towards health insurance broke out across the country. Farmers, in particular,
spontaneously opposed the proposed plan that mandated high levels of
contributions. With farmers continuing to oppose health insurance, progressive
social organizations such as the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice and the
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, which had emerged during the
democratization campaign in 1987, added their voice to the debate. A National
Medical Insurance Bill, which was in favour of the integration of insurers, passed the
National Assembly in March 1989. However, with a critical national press
continuing to publish reports that health insurance increased the financial burden
faced by employees, the then President Roh Tae-Woo exercised his right of veto over
the Bill, leading toward universal health insurance under multiple insurers. The
ensuing campaigns that were led against this decision failed to revive the proposed
National Medical Insurance Bill. This was the “second round of the integration
controversy” (Kim, 2000) under the government of President Roh Tae-Woo.
Pursuing integration and universal health insurance. When the civilian
government led by President Kim Young-Sam came to power in 1993, disputes over
14. The integration opponents claimed that it would be consistent for the state to provide medical care
using taxes as the main source of financing, as does the National Health Service (NHS) system of the
United Kingdom, and not to integrate all the countrywide insurers into a single insurer. It was unclear
what the outcome of this would be (Lee, 1989).Among the integration proponents, there were many who
wanted to see the system converted into an NHS, although thinking it better to implement the
integration of organizations while maintaining the social insurance system of financing, since a radical
shift in institution might have ended up being impracticable (Cho, 1988). But a majority of integration
proponents insisted that since the NHS system would most likely lead to a problem of the under-supply
of medical care, it would be better to take advantage of the strengths of the two systems by integrating the
funds only, while relying upon social contributions for financing, and leaving the supply of medical care
to the private sector.
15. In this process, the Federation of Medical Insurers, newly established as the successor to the “network
of insurers”, was put in charge of reviewing all the health insurance claims and an integrated computer
processing system was also put into operation.
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the integration of insurers resumed.Opposition was led by a“nationwide federation
for health insurance integration and the expanded application of insurance”, created
in April 1994. A total of 22 workers’, farmers’, and progressive social organizations
joined the federation. In the tumultuous political atmosphere of 1997, in which
President Kim Young-Sam withdrew from the then ruling party in October, the
party proposed and passed a partial integration bill, the Medical Insurance Act, at
the National Assembly in December.
The election of Kim Dae-Jung as President in December 1997 was instrumental
to the implementation of the integration reform. His administration included the
reform among its top 100 policy objectives and introduced the “health insurance
integration spearheading planning unit”, thereby mapping out specific plans. The
new integration bill, the National Health Insurance Act, was written into law in
January 1999. The integration reform was designed in three phases. In the first
phase, starting in October 1998, 227 municipal (locality) insurers and the health
insurance for government employees and teachers were integrated into the National
Medical Insurance Corporation (NMIC). In the second phase, in July 2000, the
NMIC and 140 employment-based insurers were integrated into the National
Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC), while the Health Insurance Review and
Assessment Service (HIRA) was established on an independent basis. Although this
completed the integration reform, worksite and municipal (locality) insurances
were still held in separate accounts. The third phase included a process whereby this
demarcation between the two was removed in January 2003. This was “the third
round of integration controversies” (Kim, 2000) under President Kim Young-Sam
and President Kim Dae-Jung.
The outcome of organizational change in the Republic
of Korea
Japan and South Korea had much in common in terms of the health insurance
structure in 1961 and 1989, when universal health insurance was achieved in both
countries, respectively. There were thousands of insurers in operation throughout
Japan and hundreds of insurers in South Korea. Following reform, South Korea
now operates an integrated single-payer system, completely different from
that of Japan as shown in Table 2. The integration reform brought about much
change.
First, professional expertise among the staff of insurance organizations has been
enhanced, helping to secure the basis for the strategic purchase of health care
(WHO, 2000). The potential benefits of information and communication
technologies (ICT) are being better realized, since the standardization of
operational processes has been made more readily possible under the new single
insurer scheme. The HIRA embarked upon an assessment of the appropriateness of
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antibiotics and injection medications and launched Pay-for-Performance (P4P) for
procedures for acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and Caesarean section for all
tertiary hospitals (Jeong, 2010a). The HIRA receives all medical claims from
medical providers for reimbursement following treatment by means of electronic
data interchange (EDI), accumulating information on a real-time basis. The NHIC
is building an important database that incorporates information on the insured.
This data is analyzed and put to extensive use as a basis for drafting insurance
policies.
Second, managerial costs have been reduced. The weight of managerial costs
as a measure of total health insurance expenditure fell from 8.5 per cent in
1997 to 2.4 per cent in 2008 (Jeong, 2010b). The number of branch offices of the
NHIC dwindled from 397 with 15,036 staff personnel to 250 with 10,716 staff
personnel after the merger. The larger risk pool also permitted a reduction in the
size of the financial reserves required to meet possible insolvencies. The cross-
subsidization between insurers (inter-pool financial transfers) became
unnecessary.
Third, it remains to be seen how far horizontal equity will be augmented. As
the fund pool grew bigger in size, the spread of risks increased, thereby
ameliorating the conditions on which to lift horizontal equity (Martin, Rice and
Smith, 1998). However, these expected results are still to be observed fully in
South Korea’s health insurance scheme. Inke and Xu (2009) show that lower-
income quintiles allocated a higher share of their total household consumption
expenditure to health insurance contributions than did higher-income quintiles
during 1995-2007 in every insured group in South Korea. In contrast, the
redistributive impacts of health insurance are emerging as a result both of the
expanded list of available medical care services and the lowering of co-payments
implemented since the mid 2000s.
Discussion: The comparative political economy of reform
In this section, the interests and power of various stakeholders will be reviewed
using power resources theory as the theoretical framework, and then evaluated
against other explanations. The theory of power resources underlines that an
unaffiliated individual with no organization (channel) representing his or her
interest is not empowered to be fully rewarded (Korpi, 1983; Kellermann, 2005). For
instance, variations observed in the capacity of the working class for collective
action explain cross-national differences in the distributive outcomes of
government social policies. Other explanations stem from the nature of industrial
capitalism, which requires a certain degree of redistribution to maintain economic
efficiency and state-built institutional structures that mediate preferences over
distributional policies.
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The role of stakeholders
Health insurance workers’ trade unions. In South Korea, vested interests were
centred previously on the right of each insurer to control their respective reserve
fund. The integration of insurers meant the transfer of these independently-
controlled funds into the newfound nationwide insurance organization and the
abandonment by each insurer of their vested interests. This was something not
done lightly, as evidenced by the worksite insurers having remained consistently
opposed to integration. Generally, health insurers, including worksite and
municipal (locality) insurers, expressed their political views directly or through
the trade unions of their employees. The trade unions, naturally, took a
particular interest in the possible implications of integration for the levels of
health insurance contributions to be levied and for the scale of insurance
benefits to be provided. In the process of discussing the issue of integration
in the 1990s, the two nationwide trade union federations exhibited differing
stances. Representing the interests of municipal (locality) health insurers,
the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) supported integration, while
the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), representing the interests of
worksite health insurers, did not. The KCTU was deemed to hold greater power
resources — including union density, union centralization and bargaining
coordination — and, ultimately, it was the stance backed by this federation that
was successful.
In the case of Japan, municipal (locality) health insurers insisted on ipponka
(integration). While it might be argued that integration was sought to promote a
greater degree of equity in access to health insurance, actually, their insistence upon
ipponka seems to have been intended to ease their debts. However, this insistence
gradually faded and had little impact on the integration discussion. In Japan, there
was no trade union that constituted a power resource among the municipal
(locality) insurers run by local governments. Moreover, the EHI societies that
provide health insurance coverage to employees did not want the status quo altered,
especially as regards the possible integration of the municipal (locality) health
insurers who offered coverage to the non-employed. Their concern was that when
two or more social insurance pools are unified, typically, the less-profitable and
higher-risk pool will see its financial position strengthened and the more-profitable
and lower-risk pool will see its position weakened.On this basis, employment-based
insurers with their wealthier and younger (healthier) members (and powerful
companies) resisted integration. This has been one of the main barriers to change in
Japan.
Business managers. In spite of a perception among employers that integration may
heighten health insurance costs, health insurance has won overall acceptance in
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both countries, not least since this has contributed to the stability of employment.
As stated, there is a belief that business managers will be opposed to integration as
it implies the abandonment of the vested rights achieved through the control of
funds. In reality, it would appear that business managers in South Korea took
relatively little note of the integration reform, being more preoccupied with the
economic problems created by the 1998 Asian financial crisis.
Medical providers. The Korean Medical Association was in favour of integration,
the primary reason being the need to reduce the incidence of overdue hospital bills.
The expectation was that the payment problems encountered by many small
insurers would be removed by instituting an integrated large-scaled organization—
while small individual insurers may at times run operational deficits, a national
health insurance system should be capable of balancing its finances. Nevertheless,
medical provider groups were generally less interested in the integration reform
than they had been for the pharmaceutical reform in 2000, since they apparently
had no direct interest at stake.
Conversely, the Japanese Medical Association (JMA), under the leadership of its
President Takemi, insisted that the EHI programmes be integrated with the
municipal (locality) insurance, with the justification that this could realize
consistent, life-long medical care and remove observed differences in the ability to
pay (Arioka, 1997). The JMA sought also to dismantle the SMHI in the belief that
it, being operated separately, caused financial losses to the GMHI.However, the JMA
did not clearly indicate whether insurers should be integrated at prefecture or
municipality level. The JMA has been in support of the separate establishment of
the “Medical Care Scheme for the Senior Elderly” since 2000, when Tsuboi took
office as President of the Association (Yoshihara and Wada, 2008).
Civil organizations. Civil organizations, such as the Citizen’s Coalition for
Economic Justice and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy,
represented mainly by progressive scholars as well as middle-class activists, played a
pivotal role in South Korea’s integration reform. Civil organizations engaged
positively with the issue because they saw the reform as a relatively clear social issue.
The engagement by civil organizations conveys a strong message about the
importance of this issue for citizens — on this occasion, rather than being passive
beneficiaries of policies, they sought active political involvement. In the main, the
civil organizations were comparatively free from economic interests.
In the case of Japan, few civil organizations entered discussions about the
potential organizational changes to the health insurance system. And relatively little
attempt has been made to create a social movement to push forward the reform
agenda. As such, the civil organizations of the two countries manifested themselves
in quite different ways as regards the question of health insurance integration.
65
Public health insurance in Japan and the Republic of Korea
© 2012 The author(s) International Social Security Review, Vol. 65, 2/2012
International Social Security Review © 2012 International Social Security Association
Bureaucratic groups and political parties. The responsibility for implementing
reforms lies with bureaucrats. The bureaucratic group in South Korea’s Ministry of
Health was, more often than not, sceptical and passive about the integration
reform.16 The logic of “consistency in administration” would also have affected
bureaucrats’ behaviour, in that it entails their adherence to “corporatism” (a
multiple-insurer system). This engendered a form of “path-dependency” (Wilsford,
1994). Meanwhile, the right to appoint the chief executive of the insurers —
particularly, municipal (locality) insurers — , now numbering into the hundreds,
was too attractive to lose on the part of the bureaucrats or political parties.
Although their role was primarily one of policy implementation, the bureaucrats in
South Korea gradually turned toward a reform-oriented position as the policy
environment changed.
The bureaucratic group in Japan’s Ministry of Health and Welfare were also
inclined toward dual-based operations between worksite and municipal (locality)
insurers. Like their South Korean counterparts, they did not want to face the
confusion and friction that was expected to arise from an abrupt shift within
the current system. They noticed with concern differences in income between
employees and self-employed workers. Conversely, the bureaucrats in muni-
cipalities and local government preferred the integration (ipponka) of insurers into
municipal (locality) health insurers. However, the Ministry was not willing to
transfer the authority for the EHI over to the municipal (locality) health insurance.
Though the Democratic Party of Japan had come to power and had made a public
pledge to integrate insurers, realizing this political commitment has shown to be
very difficult.
Policy environment
Factors for policy diffusion and policy divergence.Diffusion of policy occurs when
one government’s decision about whether to adopt a policy innovation is influenced
by previous choices by other governments (Walker, 1969; Collier andMessick, 1975;
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006; Graham, Shipan and Volden, 2008). During
the period spanning South Korea’s introduction of health insurance and the
realization of universal health insurance (1977-1989), the role of administrative
bureaucrats in the shaping of policies was much more influential than that of
scholars or civic groups. The majority of bureaucrats that joined government
service prior to the 1980s, when the health policies were being mapped out, had
majored in law or public administration and they had not had the experience of
16. There was a move among some minority groups of bureaucrats to take the initiative in supporting
and implementing the integration reform, but later they found themselves pushed out of power for some
time.
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studying overseas. As a consequence of time and information constraints, policy-
makers relied on cognitive shortcuts, a process that favoured policy diffusion
(Weyland, 2005). Bureaucrats could travel to neighbouring Japan to undertake field
trips or to seek advice when required. South Korea was in a favourable position to
apply Japanese laws and institutions, since Japan’s influence had led it to introduce
a legal system similar to that of Japan. This made the policy diffusion from Japan to
South Korea much stronger than that which occurred from European countries,
such as the Netherlands and Germany, to Japan.
The elite bureaucrats who joined government service later in the 1980s benefited
from overseas studies sponsored by the government. They found themselves with
ready access to overseas institutions other than those in Japan. At the same time,
scholars — who now wielded influence as a result of the movement toward greater
democratization — played a substantial role in studying foreign medical
institutions and introducing these ideas into South Korea. As a result, there was a
heightened demand for reform.
While Japan and South Korea certainly share more with each other than they do
with Western countries, closer examination reveals their differences also. First, in
Japan, regional traits stand out distinctly. The tradition of local autonomy remains
intact, in spite of its close dealings with Western countries. In contrast, in South
Korea, and under the long-standing influence of a centralized political system,
national uniformity was preferred over regional autonomy.
Second, it is evident that the President represents the core of political power in
South Korea, whereas it is less evident with whom political power rests in Japan. In
Japan, there is a limit to how much political lead can be taken in coordinating
various interest groups. This applies even to the Prime Minister, for this
appointment is the product of compromise between political parties. According to
the theory of industrial structures, the redistributive impact of state action is
thought to be lower in countries where political power is diffused and many actors
have the ability to block changes to the status quo (Kellermann, 2005). Japan’s
experience would appear to be a good example of this. In South Korea, in contrast,
the election of Kim Dae-Jung as President opened a window of opportunity for the
integration reform. Representing the core of political power, he managed to achieve
reform by pronouncing his commitment to the reform. The role played by President
Kim, based on his personal leadership, lent itself to a style of policy-making that
could be characterized as “forcing consensus” (Wong, 2004).
Third, the health insurance systems differed in the length of time (Wilensky,
1975) they took to become established and the extent to which they developed in the
two countries. Japan’s health insurance system can be traced back for almost a
century and is characterized by the influence of entrenched stakeholders. Over the
years, the Japanese system has evolved slowly to the country’s changing needs. This
makes institutional shifts even more difficult. By contrast, with its comparatively
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short history of health insurance, and with vested rights not so deeply rooted, South
Korea was able to set goals for measures that, elsewhere, might have been thought as
too ideal to achieve. South Korea pursued such ideal reforms by first learning
intensively from the lessons of Japan’s health insurance system.
Economic crisis. The financial crisis that hit South Korea at the end of 1997 affected
the nation’s health insurance system. First, the crisis facilitated a shift of political
power, which paved the way to reforms. Second, the Asian financial crisis made the
strengthening of social solidarity a top political priority, which provided an
incentive to promote the integration of health insurers. The economic depression
which has endured in Japan since the 1990s has provided the impetus to map out
the Medical Care Scheme for the Senior Elderly in 2008, but has not yet led to
integration.
Democratization and social security. According to Wong (2004), South Korea
found it possible to rapidly expand social security as part of the “democratization”
process of the 1980s and 1990s. And South Korean proponents of the integration of
health insurers, including most civil organizations, considered integration as part of
the process to expand social security. Shifts in the political environment, including
democratization and the rise of major grass-roots civil organizations, opened a
window of opportunity in favour of reform. The democratization drive helped alter
the incentives and ultimately the decisions of policy-makers. Vote-seeking
politicians needed to promote popular policies and those who were advocating
health care reforms — from bureaucrats to grass-roots activists — adapted to this
new political context (Wong, 2004). Reforms that lead to changes in vested rights
rarely occur overnight. However, the rapid democratic drive that gained ground in
South Korea provided the impetus that made such a difficult task possible in a
relatively short period.
Why did things change in South Korea, but not in Japan? Though parliamentary
democracy was firmly established in Japan, the perception that social security was
granted preferentially by bureaucratic elites was deeply entrenched, not least
because of the long-held political monopoly of the LDP. Affecting change to the
fundamental features of such a deep-rooted health insurance system, especially one
that had been shaped by elite bureaucrats, was deemed impossible perhaps. There
was no shift in political power during the period when the health insurance system
was designed and implemented — if change did occur, this was more likely to stem
from changes in the policy alignment of the incumbent political party rather
than as a result of a shift in power per se. In such a context, politicians were able to
operate in a climate of political certainty, with little need to be receptive to public
opinion. Health policy experts and major ideologues, as well as civil organizations,
found difficulty in formulating ideas about the need for fundamental reform. Thus,
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reform proposals seeking fundamental change to the health insurance system
seldom found their way on to political agendas.
Concluding observations
This article has investigated the process whereby Japan and South Korea, which
previously both operated multiple-payer SHI systems, now find themselves with
distinct models of health care. The causes for this divergence have been analyzed
through the lens of comparative political economy: differences in political power,
the policy influence of business, the extent to which regional autonomy has
developed and regional traits have been preserved, the level of political
democratization, the form of political leadership, and the scale of development of
the health insurance system. From this comparative perspective, a number of
observations can be presented.
First, it is not possible to conclude that either the corporative approach
(multiple-insurer system) or the integrative approach (single-payer system) is
superior. Nonetheless, a large risk pool can offer advantages, not least in a context of
rising health care costs and population ageing. In the initial phases of introducing
health insurance in Japan and South Korea it was not administratively feasible to
combine coverage extension on a major scale with programme integration. Over
time, with the development of an institutional framework for health insurance and
the creation of infrastructure for data processing, the administrative environment
has changed. Large insurers now have the capacities to manage effectively large
population groups.
Second, to integrate coverage under one insurer, it is now possible to challenge
the argument that employees and self-employed workers should first pay the same
uniform level of health contributions. Opponents of integration insisted that
reform of the income-reporting systems and contribution-levying formula
should precede organizational integration. However, the imposition of uniform
contributions on two population groups whose situations are different would be
inequitable: the method of imposing health insurance contributions on self-
employed workers has been mapped out, tailored appropriately to their situations,
and solidly established in both countries. The integration reform in South Korea
demonstrates that it is not differences in the contribution formula that prevent the
integration of funds which cater to different population groups. To realize successful
integration, it is sufficient to merge the financial and administrative controls,
without unifying the contribution methods. In South Korea, professional expertise
for the strategic purchase of health care has developed rapidly under the single-
payer system now covering the entire population.
In sum, this article may have important policy implications as regards to
whether Japan should move to a single-payer system and whether developing
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countries should likewise develop such a system from the outset. First, with regard
to Japan, while it may seem that the country would best benefit from a single-
payer system, its health system has been tailored to its politico-economic
circumstances. Japan is a populous country with a long tradition of local
autonomy compared to South Korea. Despite conspicuous differences between the
country’s regions, each region is relatively well equipped with a good medical care
system capable of providing quality care ranging from primary to tertiary health
care. Accordingly, this would suggest that there are good arguments for operating
health insurance organizations on a regional basis. However, the argument in
favour of a decentralized regional structure does not extend to smaller areas, such
as municipalities. It can be argued that the fragmented structure of Japan’s
insurers, numbering almost 3,600, should be reorganized into fewer but larger
organizations.17
In the case of developing countries, a number of comments can be offered.
Those countries seeking to develop universal coverage would be served best by a
single-payer system. However, the implementation and extension of coverage
under such a system would present important challenges. Based on experience,
universal coverage is often achieved through a variety of schemes. Japan’s
experience suggests that an institutional shift toward a single-payer system will be
too difficult to achieve. In contrast, South Korea’s experience shows that it is
possible to achieve universal coverage with a large number of insurers and then to
switch over to a single-payer system. From a strategic perspective, a possible
alternative would be to define from the outset an official policy goal to extend
coverage to population groups gradually using appropriate insurance mechanisms
and then, ultimately, to switch to a single-payer system. By means of trial and
error, this is the policy lesson offered by the experience of South Korea over a
20-year period.
17. Small insurers limit the risk-pooling and redistributive effects of social insurance, exacerbating
financial disparities between funds. Under a mandatory insurance scheme, it is difficult to see the
advantages of competition between insurers surfacing (van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). There is little or no
competition among health insurers even though they remain numerous in Japan, as they were also in
South Korea before the integration reform in 2000 (Kwon, 2008). These small insurers, as quasi-
autonomous and non-profit bodies, form the essence of the compulsory national health insurance
scheme. All insurers offer the same benefit package, with very few exceptions. They are not permitted
to cherry-pick healthy and wealthy individual members or to discourage older or poorer individual
from enrolling; nor are individuals permitted to shop around for the most attractive plan. “Autonomy
and competition”, as the rationale of the multiple-payer system, is hard to find among mandatory
insurers.
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